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CRIMINAL LAW- INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER- PRESENCE AS A PRE-
REQUISITE TO LIABILITY FOR PERMITTING AN INCOMPETENT To DRIVE AN 
AUTOMOBILE-Defendant gave his car keys to an intoxicated friend and per-
mitted him to operate the vehicle while the defendant was at home in 
bed. As he was driving on the wrong side of the highway, the friend was 
involved in a head-on collision which resulted in the death of the drivers 
of both vehicles. Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter1 
and of the misdemeanor of allowing an intoxicated person to operate his 
automobile.2 On appeal, held, conviction of manslaughter reversed. Al-
though one who permits an intoxicated person to drive his car is guilty 
of a misdemeanor, he cannot be held liable for involuntary manslaughter 
l See MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.321 (1948). 
2 See MICH. COMP. LAws § 257.625 (b) (Supp. 1956). 
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unless he is present at the time of the fatal event. People v. Marshall, 
362 Mich. 170, 106 N.W.2d 842 (1961). 
Involuntary manslaughter has been defined at common law as "an 
unintentional homicide, committed without excuse and under circum-
stances not manifesting or implying malice."3 Generally, convictions for 
this crime have been based on two theories of criminal responsibility: 4 
(1) the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, which states that any death result-
ing from the commission of an unlawful act not felonious in character 
is manslaughter;15 and (2) the concept of criminal negligence, which in-
volves the commission of an act that might produce death or serious 
bodily harm without the precaution that a reasonable man would take to 
prevent injury.6 Despite the implication that liability will automatically 
follow under either of these approaches when all the elements necessary 
for conviction are present, there have been certain exceptions recognized 
by the judiciary,7 the predominant one being remoteness of causation.8 
It would seem that use of a strict "but for" test of causation would 
clearly result in holding the defendant liable on the facts of the instant 
case.0 However, there is a competing consideration here, namely the re-
luctance of the courts to convict, without prior legislative approval, in 
cases where the causal factor has been thought to be too remote.10 In the 
principal case, apparently one of first impression, the court seemingly 
3 CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES § 10.12, at 634 (6th ed. 1958) • See WHARTON, HOMICIDE 
§ 6 (3d ed. 1907) ; State v. Pond, 125 Me. 453, 134 Atl. 572 (1926); People v. Ryczek, 224 
Mich. 106, 194 N.W. 609 (1923). 
4 A third possible basis of conviction is for aiding and abetting the commission of 
an unlawful act so as to be either a principal or an accessory to the crime. This latter 
route has been seldom utilized by the judiciary in connection with involuntary 
manslaughter, perhaps explainable by the general disagreement as to its propriety. 
Compare State v. Kennedy, 109 S.C. 141, 95 S.E. 350 (1918) and 1 ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 66 (8th ed. 1877) with State v. McVay, 47 R.I. 292, 132 Atl. 436 (1926) and 
1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 678 (8th ed. 1892). 
15 CLARK & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 10.14 at 639. For an approach suggesting 
the abolition of the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine and the replacement of it with 
the concept of negligent manslaughter, see Johnston, A Re-examination of the Mis-
demeanor Manslaughter Doctrine, 38 KY. L.J. 118 (1949). 
6 More than mere ordinary negligence is required, however, and the test the courts 
ordinarily invoke is that of gross or wanton or culpable negligence. See MILLER, CRIMINAL 
LAW § 93 (b) at 287 (1934). 
7 For a discussion of the exception pertaining to the nature of the unlawful act 
(malum prohibitum-malum in se distinction) see Wilner, Unintentional Homicide in the 
Commission of an Unlawful Act, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 811 (1939). See also 21 MICH. L. 
REV. 596 (1923). Compare PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 57-59 (1957). 
8 Johnston, supra note 5, at 121; 21 MICH. L. REv. 596 (1923). See generally Sayre, 
Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REv. 689, 723 (1930) . 
o There seems to be but little question that the defendant would be civilly liable. 
Sec MICH. COMP. LAws § 257.401 (Supp. 1956); JAMIESON & BROWN, MICHIGAN AUTO-
MOBILE LAw § 122 (2d ed. 1951); PROSSER, TORTS 513 (2d ed. 1955). See generally id. 
§ 84, at 513. 
10 See State v. Satterfield, 198 N.C. 682, 153 S.E. 155 (1930) ; PERKINS, op. cit. supra 
note 7, at 603; Johnston, supra note 5, at 121-22. 
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reflects this reluctance and establishes presence as an arbitrary dividing 
line for liability11 in an attempt to avoid what it feels would be undue 
severity. Cases in which the defendant had entrusted his car to an in-
competent and was present with him at the time of the fatal accident are 
distinguished.12 Thus, according to the court's rationale, if the defendant 
is riding with the incompetent at the time the accident occurs he may be 
held guilty of involuntary manslaughter; but the moment he steps from 
the vehicle, permitting the driver to continue on, he is virtually relieved 
of all criminal responsibility for any death directly attributable to his un-
lawful or negligent act in allowing such person to take the wheel initially. 
When considered from the standpoint of causation, such reasoning appears 
to be unsound. 
Remoteness of causation does not depend on the physical proximity 
of the accused to the scene of the crime;13 rather, it depends on the type 
of forces that have intervened between the unlawful or negligent act com-
plained of and the resulting injury.14 In the principal case, the defendant's 
unlawful or negligent conduct was established when his intoxicated friend 
began to drive the automobile. The only intervening force between this 
conduct and the killing was the negligence of the friend in driving on the 
wrong side of the road; however, the courts, in determining liability in 
the past, have not deemed this sufficient to render causation so remote that 
the defendant's negligence would be excusable.15 It seems that the absence 
of the defendant in the principal case should be of no greater relevance 
than was the absence of a manager of a railroad from the scene of a wreck; 
and yet, in the latter case,16 the indictment of the manager on a man-
slaughter charge for permitting an inexperienced and incompetent engi-
neer to operate the train that caused a wreck was sustained. In both cases 
the accused had negligently set in motion the force that made the killing 
possible,17 and his whereabouts at the moment the force resulted in the 
11 See principal case at 172, 106 N.W.2d at 843. "If defendant Marshall had been by 
McClary's side an entirely different case would be presented, but on the facts before us 
Marshall, as we noted, was at home in bed." 
12 See, e.g., Story v. United States, 16 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 
U.S. 739 (1927) (defendant permitted intoxicated friend to drive); People v. Ingersoll, 
245 Mich. 530, 222 N.W. 765 (1929) (defendant permitted inexperienced driver to drive 
his car); Armstrong v. State, 48 Okla. Crim. 146, 289 Pac. lll5 (1930) (defendant slept 
in back seat while inexperienced friend drove) ; State v. Hopkins, 147 Wash. 198, 265 
Pac. 481, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 617 (1928) (intoxicated friend). 
13 See PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 602; Beale, The Proximate Consequences of 
an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633, 643 (1920). 
14 See MILLER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 90-91. See generally Beale, supra note 13, at 
658. 
15 Cases cited note 12 supra. 
16 People v. Smith, 56 Misc. 1, 105 N.Y. Supp. 1082 (Sup. Ct. 1907) • 
17 See Regina v. Dante, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 102 (1865) (defendant's vicious horse 
attacked and killed a person) • 
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injury should be of no consequence for purposes of determining causation.18 
Apart from causation, however, there might be some validity in a con-
sideration of the presence factor. For if the defendant were present, it 
could be maintained that he would be in a position to exercise control 
over the actions of the driver and thereby possibly prevent any accident. 
It would seem that such an argument should be rejected as too speculative, 
for it is equally plausible to contend that there is even greater negligence 
in permitting such a person to operate an automobile by himself. 
The court placed a great deal of emphasis on a need for new approaches 
to resolve the problem presented, and declared that these approaches 
"rest with the legislature not the courts.''19 Although the principal case 
presents a somewhat unprecedented fact situation, the necessity for legis-
lative action, in order to sustain the conviction, is by no means clear. 
Following either the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule or the criminal negli-
gence approach, the guilt of the defendant appears to be inescapable. 
However, in drawing the line of liability at presence, the court is trying 
to avoid what it, no doubt, feels would be a harsh result. It is not sug-
gested that this is undesirable, but it must be recognized that purely as a 
matter of law this case is indistinguishable from a number of other cases 
in which manslaughter convictions have been sustained.20 
Peter D. Byrnes, S.Ed. 
18 Cf. People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 64: Pac. 286 (1901) (defendant sent poisoned 
candy through the mail) • 
10 Principal case at 174, 106 N.W.2d at 844. 
20 Cases cited note 12 supra. 
